
On July 20, 2026, the China Coast Guard attacked a Philippines Navy soldier on the head with a wooden stick on Ayungin, i.e., Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. The Philippines has described this as part of China’s continuous aggressive and provocative behavior. This incident is not just a maritime dispute, but is considered to be a part of China’s larger strategy through which it wants to strengthen its dominance over the South China Sea by breaking the siege of the First Island Chain.
China’s pressure on Ayungin Shoal is continuously increasing
On July 20, 2026, China Coast Guard personnel attacked a Philippine Navy soldier on the head with a wooden stick near BRP Sierra Madre on Ayungin i.e. Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines Armed Forces called it a clear example of China’s provocation and aggressive attitude. Earlier in February 2023, China Coast Guard Ship 5205 had used military grade laser on Philippines Coast Guard’s BRP Malapascua. In August 2023, an attempt was made to stop the supply mission due to strong current of water. On June 17, 2024, Chinese Coast Guard soldiers carrying sharp weapons boarded Philippines boats, injuring eight soldiers. All this was done at such a level that there was no situation of direct military response under the Philippines-US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. This latest incident has happened at a time when the Philippines is chairing ASEAN and negotiations are going on on the code of conduct.
Why is the first island chain the biggest challenge for China?
The First Island Chain is a sea ring that extends to the Kuril Islands, Japan, Ryukyu, Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo. It originated in America’s 1949 NSC 48/2 plan, but later Chinese strategists saw it as a siege that needed to be broken. Major sea routes like Miyako Strait, Bashi Channel and Luzon Strait are constantly monitored by the US and its allies. On the other hand, America has access to nine military bases in the Philippines under the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, the Philippines-US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2014. On January 15, 2026, the Philippines and Japan also signed the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement. In such a situation, it is not considered easy for the Chinese Navy to reach the open Pacific Ocean.
The strategy of occupying the South China Sea and the challenge of the 2016 decision
According to the analysis, China paid more attention to the South China Sea rather than the East China Sea because it gets more strategic advantages here. Except for the Philippines, none of the Southeast Asian claimant countries are treaty allies of the United States, and ASEAN’s consensus system is unable to provide a strong response against China. This area is also the most important way to access the deep sea from the Yulin submarine base in Hainan. Apart from this, about 80 percent of China’s imported crude oil passes through the Malacca route, which in 2003 was called the Malacca dilemma by then President Hu Jintao.
On July 12, 2016, the arbitration tribunal in the Philippines vs. China case clearly stated that the Nine Dash Line has no legal basis under the United Nations Law of the Sea and that the Second Thomas Shoal falls within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. However, China called this decision invalid from the beginning and did not make any changes in its claim or action. For this reason, incidents like Ayungin are now being considered a part of China’s long-term strategy in the South China Sea.
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